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(L. A. No. 26046. In Bank. Jan. 27, 1961.J 
JAMES S. REID, Respondent, v. OVERLAND MACHINED 
PHODrCTS (a Corporation) ct aI., Appellants. 
[1] Accord-Effect of Payment of Conceded Part of Disputed 
Claim.-Ordinarily the conditional payment of either an 
alllount concededly owed or an amount in excess of that con-
cededly owed is sufficient consideration for settlement of n 
bona fitle disputed claim, and an offer and acceptance of such 
amount given in full payment for the disputed claim dis-
charges the debt. 
[2] Labor-Wages-Payment of Amount Due in Case of Dispute.-
In view of Lab. Code, § 206, providing that in case of a dispute 
over wages the employer must pay, without condition and 
within a specified time, all wages conceded by him to be due, 
leaving to the employee all remedies he might otherwise be 
entitled to on any balance claimed, in a dispute over wages 
the employer may not withhold wnges concededly due to coerce 
settlement of the disputcd balance. 
[3] ld.-Wages-Compromise of Dispute.-An employer and em-
ployee may compromise a bona fide dispute over wages, but 
such a compromise is binding only if it is made after the 
wages concededly due have been unconditionally paid. 
[4J ld.-Wages-Commissions.-Lab. Code, § 206, applies to con-
ditional tenders of commissions. (Disapproving any implica-
tion in Sayre v. Western BOll:l, 76 Cal.App.2d 793, 799, 174 
P.2d 466, that cOllllllitisioW'; are different from other wages as 
being inconsistent with Lab. Code, § 200, subd. (a).) 
[5] Id.-Wages-Payment of Amount Due in Case of Dispute.-
Lab. Code, § 206, is designed to secure to a wage earner prompt 
payment of all wages concededly due, and it expressly pre-
cludes an employer's coercing a settlement of disputed claims 
by offering conditional payment. 
[IJ Payment of undisputed amount or liability as consideration 
for discharge of disputed amount or liability, note, 112 A.L.R. 
1219. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Accord and Satisfaction, § 31; Am.Jur., 
Accord and Satisfaction, § 60. 
(2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Labor, § 19; Am.Jur., Labor, § 808 et 8CfJ. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Accord, § 6; [2-5, 10] Labor, ~ 14: 
[6] Statutes, ~ 16; (7] Contracts, § 45; [8, 9] Accord, § 2; [11] 
Evidencc, ~ 2-l7; [12] Appeal and Error, § 1716; [13] Master 1111(1 
Sen'ant, ~ 59; [14] 1\[aster lind Serv:mt, § 51; (ViJ Evidence, ~ 3!}O; 
[16] COli tracts, § 1;)0. 
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[6J Statutes-Operation and Effect.-Where a statute prohibits 
or attach('s a penalty to the doing of an act, the act is voirl 
though the statute docs not expressly pronounce it so. 
[7] Contracts - Legality':"'- Contracts in Violation of Statute.-A 
statute's imposition of a penalty on the doing of a certain a<!t 
implies a prohibition of the act and a contract founded on 
such act is void. 
[8] Accord-Requisites.-A claim will not be discharged when the 
purported accord and satisfaction violates state law. 
[9] Id.-Requisites.-Since a discharge of claims byway of accord 
and satisfaction is dependent on contract, express or implied, 
the essentials necessary to a valid contract generally must be 
present in an accord and satisfaction. 
[10] Labor-Wages-Payment of Amount Due in Case of Dispute. 
-Where two checks were mailed to a former employee as a 
single conditional payment in satisfaction of his wages, but at 
least the aJllount designated on one check was for the pay-
ment of wages concededly due and the tender thereof was con-
ditioned on the release of all additional liability, no accord and 
satisfaction could result from the retention or cashing of either 
check. 
[11] Evidence-Hearsay-Declarations in Papers and Documents. 
-Statements in the pleadings or memoranda of counsel as to 
matters not in evidence are hearsay, self-serving and incom-
petent as evidence. 
[12] Appeal-Reversible Error-Amount of Recovery.-A judg-
ment must be reversed where the court relied on improper evi-
dence to arrive at it, such as a memorandum of counsel re-
sulting in an increase in the judgment frolll $5,741 to $11,486.52. 
[13] Master and Servant-Compensation-Actions-Appeal-Re-
versible Error.-In an action by a former employee for an ac-
counting for wages and cOlllmissions, defendant was prejudiced· 
by the court's reliance on incompetent evidence (memorandum 
of counsel) for its determina.tion that the contract requirerl 
payment of commissions on "change orders" received before 
termination of the contract of employment where defendant 
stipulated only to the aDlount of such orders, not to the amount 
of the changes therein before or after termination of the 
contract, and did not concede liability for commissions on 
these orders, where plaintiff was not entitled, under the tt·ia 1 
court's interpl'etation of the contract, to commissions on an~· 
increases on the "ehange orders" after termination of the con-
tract, and where there was no competent evidence from which 
the amount of the ch:IIlg"('s nfter termination of employment 
could be computed. 
[7] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 73; Am.Jur., Contracts, § 161. 
) 
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[14] Id.-Compensa.tion-Actions-Evidence.-In :m action by a 
fonner employee for :m nccountill~ for wn~es lind commis!;ions, 
the court erred in excluding E'vidence offerea 1Iy defendant to 
aid in interpretation of the written contract of employment, 
tending to prove that during the preliminary negotiations the 
parties agreed that to Il\'oid tracing the date on each order 
for the purpose of determining the 1I1110unt of commission on 
termination of the contract the cOlllllli~,:;ion should be paid on 
gross business invoiceu during the employment, nnd that plain-
tiJf was paid and understood the contract to require payment ' 
of commissions on business invoiced immediately after he be-
gan his employment though the orders were obtnined before 
his employment. 
[16] Evidence-Extrinsic Evidence-In Aid of Int.erpretation.-
When the language used in a written contract is fairly sus-
ceptible to the construction claimed by one of the parties, ex-
trinsic evidence may be cont'idered, not to vary or modify 
the terms of the agreement, but to aid the court in ascertaining 
its true meaning. 
[16J Contracts-Interpretation-Construction by Parties.-Acts of 
the parties under a coutract should be used as 3. reliable means 
of interpreting an ambiA,"uOus coutract and al'rh:ing at their 
intention. While not conclusivE', the construction thus given 
a contract by the parties before any controversy has arisen 
as to its meaning will, when reasonable, be adopted and en-
forced by the courts. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Allen '}'. Lynch, Judge. Reversed. 
Action for an accounting for wages and commissions al-
legedly due a former employee. Judgment for plaintiff re-
versed. 
George C. Black and Patrick Kerrigan for Appellants. 
John F. Bremer for Respondent. 
Pauline Nightingale, Effie Sparling, William P. Nutter and 
Milford A. :Maron as Amici Curiae on behalf of Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plliintiff was employed by Overland Ma-
chined Products Company on J"ebruary 25, 1952, as its 
exclusive sales representative. In this action he seeks an 
accounting for wages and commissions allegedly earned pur-
suant to a written contract of employment. 
The contract provides: "For his services rendered herein 
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and for faithful performance thereof, second party shall 
receive a commission of five per cent, (5%) of the entire 
gross business done by first party subsequent to 25th day of 
February, 1952. 
"It is distinctly understood and agreed that second party 
shall only be entitled to reeeive any commission or any other 
sums of money herein specified on such new business, contracts 
or purchase orders as may be obtained or received by first 
party subsequent to 25th day of February,. 1952, and only 
then so long as this agreement remains in full1'orce and effect. " 
The contract guarantees plaintiff certain monthly amounts, 
and provides that whenever the commission exceeds the guar-
anteed amounts the balance of the commission "shall be paid 
. . . if as and ,vhen the accounts receivable • . . are paid. " 
The monthly guarantees were paid when due and are not ill 
dispute. Each party is given the power to terminate the 
contract on 30 days' notice. 
The contract was terminated effective November 27, 1953. 
On February 1u, 1954, plaintiff demanded the payments of 
commissions owed to him and a closing of his account. De-
fendant sent plaintiff a check for $792.14 bearing an endorse-
ment that the payment 'vas" payment in full for all commis-
sions due" under the contract. Plaintiff returned the check 
objecting to the endorsement. 
Thereafter an accountant employed by plaintiff to ex-
amine defendant's books advised defendant that the previous 
offer of payment was short $15. Defendant then sent plaintiff 
the original check for $792.14 and another check for $15. The 
letter accompanying the two checks stated that the payment 
was made in full payment of all commissions due under the 
contract. Plaintiff cashed. the $15 check, which did not have 
a restrictive endorsement, and retained and lost the check 
for $792.14. There was no further communication between 
the parties until plaintiff filed this action. 
The parties stipulated that defendant owes commissions of 
$792.14 on orders invoiced to the time of the termination of 
employment, and the defendant has paid this amount into 
court. Although the parties disagree on defendant's liability 
for commissions on orders obtained before the termination of 
employment but invoiced after such termination, the amount 
of these orders was stipUlated to at the trial. 'rhe effect of 
these stipulations is that 5 per cent of such orders is $10,6941 
lThe figure in the original stipUlation was slightly ~igher. ThiB fiaure 
representa deductions made at plaintiff'a request. 
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if all the orders are considered or $4,948.95 if the orders that 
were changed after their original solicitation are deleted. 
The latter orders were referred to by the parties as "change 
orders. " 
The trial court awarded plaintiff cOl1llnissions on an of the 
disputed orders. Defendant challenges this judgment on 
three grounds: (1) The court erred in its eonclusion of law 
that the evidence failed to establish an accord and satisfaction; 
(2) the court relied on incompetent evidence in detcrmining 
that plaintiff is entitled to commissions on the "change ord-
ers"; and (3) the court erroneously excluded extrinsic 
evidence offered to prove that the parties intended that com-
missions should be paid only on orders invoiced during the 
employment. 
The trial court correctly ruled that there was no accord 
and satisfaction. Either all or at least $792.14 of the amount 
of defendant's offer to plaintiff was for wages concededl~­
owed to him. [1] Ordinarily the conditional payment of 
either an amount concededly owed or an amount in excess 
of that concededly owed is sufficient consideration for a settle-
ment of a bona fide disputed claim. (Potter v. Pacific Coast 
Lumber Co., 37 Ca1.2d 592, 602 [234 P.2d 16] ; 'see Corbin on 
Contracts, vo1. 6, § 1289, p. 128) and an offer and acceptance 
of such an amount given in full payment for the disputed 
claim therefore discharges the debt. 
[2] Labor Code, section 206, however, places wage claims 
in a separate category. That section provides: "In case of 
a dispute over wages, the employer shall pay, with01d condition 
and within the time set by this article, all wages, or part 
thereof, conceded by him to be due, leaving to the employee 
all remedies he might otherwise be entitled to as to any balance 
claimed." (Italics added.) Hence in a dispute over wages 
the employer may not withhold wages concededly due to coerce 
settlement of the disputed balance. [3] An employer and 
employee may of course compromise a bona fide dispute over 
wages but such a compromise is binding only if it is made 
after the wages concededly due have been unconditionally paid. 
[4] Defendants invoke Sayre v. Western Bowl, 76 Cal. 
App.2d 793, 799 [174 P.2d 466], for the proposition that 
section 206 of the Labor Code does not apply to conditional 
tenders of commissions or bonuses. That case involved the 
collection of penalty wages and not an accord and satisfaction. 
Any implication therein that commissions are different from 
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other wages is inconsistent with Labor Code, section 200, 
subdivision (a) 2 and is disapproved. 
[5] Defendant's contention that Labor Code, Rectioll 206, 
merely proviues a statutory remedy for its breach but docs 
not invalidate an accord and satisfaction entered into in viola-
tion of the statute is without merit. Section 206 is deRigned 
to secure to the wage earner prompt payment of aU wages 
concededly due and it expressly precludes an employer's 
coercing a settlement of disputed claims by Offering conditional 
payment. [6] "Where a statute prohibits or attaches a 
penalty to the doing of an act, the act is void even though 
the statute does not expressly pronounce it so .. " [7] The 
imposition by statute of a penalty implies a prohibition of the 
act referred to and a contract founded upon such act is void." 
(Stonehockel' v. Oassano, 154 Cal.App.2d 732, 736 [316 P.2d 
717]; accord: Smith v. Bach, 183 Cal. 259, 262 [191 P. 14].) 
[ 8 ] It has long been settled that a claim will not be diR-
charged when the purported accord aIHI satisfaction violates 
the state law. [9] In Sierra etc. Park 00. v. Universal Elec. 
etc. 00., 197 Cal. 376, 387 [241 P. 76], we refused to discharge 
a claim because the alleged accord and satisfaction would have 
resulted in utility payments contrary to the law, stating that: 
4' 'The discharge of claims by way of accord and satisfaction 
is dependent upon contract express or implied; and it follows 
that the essentials necessary to valid contracts generally must 
be present in a contract of accord and satisfaction.' " 
[10] The two checks were mailed to plaintiff as a single 
conditional payment in satisfaction of his claim for wages. 
Since at least $792.14 was for the payment of wages con-
cededly due and the tender thereof was conditioned on the 
rclease of all additional liability no accord and satisfaction 
could result from the retention or cashing of either check. 
Plaintiff was therefore entitled to recovcr on the contract. 
We have concluded, however, that the judgment must be 
reversed because of errors in the admission and exclusion of 
evidence. 
The trial court relied on incompetent evidence for its de-
termination that the contract required payment of commis-
sions on the "change orders." At the f'nd of the trial th~ 
court instructed plaintiff's attorney to prepare findings and 
·Subdivision (a) of Labor Code, section 200, defines wages ns follows: 
" • Wages' includes all amounts for labor performed by employees 
of every des<!ription, whether the nmount i.~ fixe.l or nseertained by the 
standard of time, task, piece, commission basis, or other method of cnl· 
culation.' , 
) 
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judgment awarding plaintiff the $;92.14 concededly due and 
$4,948.95 representing 5 percent commission 011 all unchanged 
orders obtained before termination of employment regardless 
of when inyoiced. The court stated, however, that the "change 
orders" amounting to $115,625.61 are not part of the "gross 
business done" under the contract and" accordingly plaintiff 
is not entitled to commission thereon." Plaintiff then sub-
mitted a "Memorandum .. \.fter Examining Change Order, 
Purchase Orders and Invoices." In this memorandum plain-
tiff stated that he had just spent throo days reviewing de-
fendant's invoices and that most of the changes on the 
"change orders" were 111ade before the termination of the em-
ployment contract and that the rt>maining ehang<'s w('re of a 
minor n~ture. After rCl'iting some or these chall~l's plaintiff'!'! 
attorney suggested that plaintiff he awardefl commis!'!ions on 
$114,908.76 of the $115,625.61 "change order!'!." The court 
then awarded plaintiff a ju(lf!ment for $11,486.52 instead of 
$5,741.09 as it had originally propo!'.Cd. 
[11] The "Memorandum Aftt'r Examining Change Orde:-r!'!. 
Purchase Order!'! anel Im'oices" "'as simply an assertion of 
facts by counsel all to matters not in eviden('e. Defendant 
l1ad no opportunity to cross-t>xamine plnintiff'~ ('ounsel on 
the stat<'mt'nt or to offer evidence in rebuttal. Statements in 
the ple:-adingR or memorllnda of eonnsel arc heat'sa~', self.s('TY-
ing, and incompetent as evidenct'. (Jeffers v. Screen Extra., 
(;11/711, blr., 134 CaJ.App.2tl 622, 623 [286 r.2<l 301 ; JIitslIlIchi 
y. SeclIrity-First National Balik, 103 Cal.App.2d 214. 219 
[229 P.2rl 376] ; s('c 6 Wigmore, Evidf'l1<.'(', § 1709, pp. 39-40.) 
[12] Rplinu('c hy the court on thi!'! memorandum was 
clearly prejuilicial, for it reslllt('d in an increase:- in the judl!-
ment from $5,741 to $11,486.52. A jnc1~m('nt mnst be revt>r~('rl 
wh('n it is ('lear tllat n court has r('li('o on improper eviden('t> 
to arrive at it. (Fcu·c1. Y. FCII'f'7. 23 C'al.2d 43], 433 r144 
P.2d 592] ; O. O. Ba.shaw 00. v. Woo(l & Stl!vens, Inc., 72 CAL 
App. 94. 101 [236 P. 346].) 
[13] Plaintiff contends, ho,yewr, that tIle court's reliance 
on the memorandum was not preju(licinl, on the grollJl(l thnt 
the pm-ties had stipulat('d that $115,625.61 of "change order;;" 
were received be:-forc the t('rminntioll of the pontraet. Df'-
fendant stiplilated only to the amount of such orc1t'rs and 
not to the amonnt of the ('han.~cs therein before or after the 
termination of the contra<'t and (lill not concede liahility for 
commissions on thl'se or<1t>r". rnd<'r the trial ('onrt's internr!'-
tation of the ('ontract plaintiff is 110t entitled to commissions 
. J 
210 REID V. OVERLA~D MACIIlNED PRODUCTS [55 0.2d 
on allY increases on the" change oruers" after the termination 
or the contract. There is 110 competent eviucnee in the record 
from wlloich the amount of the changes after the termination 
of employment can be computed. 
[ 14] The trial court also erred in excluding evidence 
offered to aid in the interpretation of the contract. Defendant 
offered to prove that during prdimillary negotiations the 
parties agreed that to avoid trac·ing the date on each order for 
the purpose of determining the amouut of commission upon 
termination of the contract, t1}e commission should be paid 
upon the gross business invoiced during the employment. 
Defendant further offered to prove that plaintiff was paid 
and understood the contract to require payment of commis-
sions on business invoiced immediately after he began his 
employment even though the orders were obtained before his 
employment. 
This evidence should have been admitted. [15] When I 
the language used in the contract is fairly susceptible to the 
construction claimed by one of the parties, extrinsic evidence 
may be considered, not to vary or modify the terms of the 
agreement, but to aid the court in ascertaining its trne mean-
ing. (Beneficial etc. Ins. 00. v. Kutt Hitke & 00., 46 Ca1.2d 
517,524 [297 P.2d 428].) [16] "'The acts of the parties 
under the contract airora one of the most reliable means of 
arriving at their intention; and, \vhile not conclusive, tIle con-
struction thus given to a contract by the parties befol"e any 
('olltroversy has arii'len as to its meaning \vill, when reasonable, 
he adopted and enforcea by the courts.'" (Orestview Oeme-
frry Assn. v. Dier1en, 54 Cal.App.2d 744, 7G3 [8 Ca1.Rptr. 
427, 356 P.2d 171].) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White, J., 
and Dooling, J., concurred . 
